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In several Western countries the relevance of traditional social cleavages in explaining 
citizens' political orientations has been put to test  (Elff 2007). Albeit with differing 
intensity, since long these societies appear characterised by a declining relevance of 
collective vs. individual aspects in political choice, so much that voting behaviour has 
become increasingly unpredictable on the basis of citizens' social characteristics 
(Dalton 2002a,b; Corbetta 2006). The erosion (though not the wholesome 
disappearance) of structural determinants  – an individual thought politically according 
to what he was socially (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Guadet 1968) - seems to have made 
individuals freer to express a political choice on the basis of their personal values 
(Rose e McAllister 1986). With the fading away of structural determinants - among 
which "class voting" had a prominent position -- individual values and attitudes seem to 
be able to go beyond their perennial secondary contribution to the explanation of 
citizens' political preferences. Among emerging values and attitudes, the religious ones 
draw considerable attention, both in comparing countries, since secularization took on 
specific characteristics in each country, and to shed light within different nation-states, 
given that even among people who claim to belong to the same church/denomination 
individuals express a variety of religious orientations and behaviours. An increasingly 
individualized, multi-faceted and "liquid" religiosity. Among Catholics, in particular, the 
image is that of a "light" church peopled by autonomous believers (Pace 2009).  
However, if in the Old Continent secularization appears widespread, this situation 
represents an exception when we look at other contexts. In the Americas a new 
religious effervescence is apparent (Davie 2002; Hervieu-Léger 2003; Berger, Davie, 
Fokas 2008). More specifically, in Latin America, class voting has never been so 
forceful as in Europe (Deegan-Krause 2006). Two different and distant contexts, which 
deserve a closer consideration of how religious values and attitudes, on the one hand, 
and socio-structural aspects, on the other, contribute in shaping political preferences.  
To explore such complex aspects, our choice has been in the first place to restrict the 
analysis only to people belonging to a specific religious denomination, that is the 
Roman Catholic, the most widespread religion both in Europe and in Latin America. 
Within these macro-areas, the paper focuses on Italy and Brazil: these countries are of 
particular interest for their national specificities for what concerns religion. Italy is a 
country where Catholic religion traditionally is the almost exclusive denomination to 
which citizens belong, although at present a patchwork of diverse practices and beliefs 
characterizes the Catholic world. Brazil, on there hand, has the largest Catholic 
population in the world and is marked by an increasing plurality of religious 
denominations (especially since the 1980s and even more so the 1990s), to the point 
that Catholics, who exhibit more similar values and attitudes within themselves, have 
been confronted by a growing external religious patchwork.  
Given the difficulty to compare two party systems which are considerably different from 
one another, the effect of different indicators of religiosity, and secondly of some social 
characteristics, will be measured with relation to the individuals' positioning along the 
left-right ideological axis. Although it is often difficult to extend the concepts of left and 
right beyond the Western context, the Brazilian case is nonetheless characterized by a 
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significant historical presence of working-class political parties, which contributed to 
introduce these political polarities within political language and discourse. 
In particular, two linear regression models are presented: in the first the positioning of 
Catholics along the left-right axis is explained in each country by the variables that 
relate to religious values and attitudes; in the second model socio-demographic 
variables are included for each country, in order to control the first model. 
The main research results show that both models in each country explain only to a 
limited extent the choice by Catholics between left and right. Nevertheless, it is 
empirically verified that, in the first model, religious values and attitudes are as a whole 
important in Italy and that greater religiosity is linked to an increased positioning on the 
right. This evidence disappears when the socio-demographic variables are introduced, 
showing some traces, though much faded, of the persistence of the relationship 
between social structure and ideological positioning. In Brazil, on the contrary, religious 
attitudes and values in the main are not significant in explaining the positioning on the 
ideological axis, while only age and residence in the most economically developed 
areas of the country are among the important socio-demographic variables. This adds 
evidence to the fact that socio-economic structure is not directly influential in shaping 
the political preferences of Brazilians. 
 
Italy 
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LEFT AND RIGHT: TWO POLES OF A STILL ALIVE CONTINUUM 
Two major dichotomies have shown for a long time in Western countries to have a 
broad significance in structuring citizens’ political choices: religious vs. secular and left 
vs. right (Inglehart 1984; Dalton 2002a) 1. Right and left are two antithetical and 
mutually exclusive concepts that have been used for more than two centuries to 
designate the conflicts of political thought and action. Not only, right and left are a dyad 
in which the two terms buttress each other, ie there is no right if there is no left and 
vice versa (Bobbio 1995). Born during the industrial revolution, left and right represent 
two opposite poles of the conceptualization of conflict with respect to economic 
inequality, the ownership of the means of production and the desirability, or not, of the 
market economy (Knutsen 1995). In fact, the main aspect of the right is the supremacy 
of the market in regulating the economy and society, the search for a weak state and 
opposition to government intervention. In contrast, the left prevails the notion of an 
active role of the state to achieve social equality, so that "regulation of markets and 
private enterprises, societal planning, government redistribution via progressive 
taxation and welfare reforms are necessary for obtaining important goals such as full 
employment and social equality "(Knutsen 1995, p. 161). 
                                                      
1 For an analysis of left-right materialistic value orientation see: Von Beyme 1985; Lafferty and Knutsen 
1984; Inglehart 1984. 
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In the political universe, left and right thus do not represent only ideologies but 
opposite policy options. This structuring of political space, a consequence of the 
industrial revolution, however, has been gradually crossed by single issue politics, the 
different conformation of the new collective movements and more generally by post-
materialistic values in post-industrial societies, which seem to render obsolete the right 
and left divide. It is not by accident that terms like "old left" and "old right" have been 
used in political debate to refer to the left-right polarization that showed tight 
overlapping with the structural characteristics of industrial society, while "new left" and 
"new right" to emphasize that this overlap has faded, up to the point of getting to class 
de-alignment (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984). Nevertheless, it is always right and 
left. 
The emergence of post-materialistic values, however, has not erased the relevance of 
the left-right axis (se for example Dalton 2002a; Elff 2007), since even people with a 
post-materialistic value orientation is still required to take a position on left and right 
axis, which is still central to most of Western Democracies. And, not surprisingly, those 
who define themselves as the new left and the new right consider their political roots of 
the industrial period as structuring elements of their identity and political positioning 
(Knutsen 1995). Although the content of the two opposites has partially changed, left 
and right continue to be persistent categories that structure the political space. For this 
reason, occupation, social class, education and family income, although with a 
decreasing correlation over time, confirmed to be influential variables on the 
positioning along the left-right axis in Western democracies. 
But to analyze the political space using the antithetical concepts of left and right in 
contexts other than Western democracies has always raised particular concerns. 
Particularly in Latin American countries, including in Brazil, the political space has 
been often characterized by "floating politicians and floating voters" (Conaghan 1995, 
p. 450), greatly contributing to destabilizing the possibility of permanent positions, both 
for parties and individuals, along the left-right axis. The great social heterogeneity of 
the electoral support enjoyed by the parties (Luna and Zechmeister 2005) and the high 
level of change of party affiliation on the part of politicians - something called troca de 
camiseta (change of shirt) in Brazil - confer a remarkable fluidity to the party system 
and make the relevance of ideological polarities fade away. Also Mainwaring and 
Torcal (2003) find a much weaker relationship in Latin America than in Europe 
between party choice and positioning on the left-right axis. Nevertheless, positioning 
oneself on the left rather than on the right is not empty of meaning in Brazil. In fact, 
Roberts (2002) finds in this country a stronger tradition of "class-voting" - compared to 
other Latin American countries - due to the presence of a "labour-mobilizing party 
system", which strengthened during the years of opposition to the military regime. To 
confirm this, Mainwarding and Torcal (2003) find that in Brazil class vote is statistically 
significant, and Carreirão (2007) shows empirically how in the 2002 presidential 
elections positioning oneself towards the left made the voter more inclined to support 
Lula . 
 
6 
 
ITALIAN AND BRAZILIAN CATHOLICS ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE 
 
The distribution of, respectively, Italian and Brazilian Catholics along the left-right scale 
is shown in the figures below. Data from the WVS — four waves for Italy and three for 
Brazil — display interesting differences between the two countries. 
Italian Catholics distribute themselves along the left-right axis in a “normal” fashion in 
all surveys, showing an increasing concentration around the intermediate values of the 
scale. This distribution is also basically stable across time. 
This feature is present also in the case of Brazilian Catholics, although the distribution 
takes on specific characteristics: the majority of interviewees are concentrated around 
value “5”, while two significant peaks are detected on the left end (1) and, even more 
so, on the extreme right end (10) of the scale2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 However, it has to be observed that in the last wave of the WVS extreme values have been eroded in 
favour of central ones. 
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL: RELIGIOUS VARIABLES AND SOCIO-
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Given the overall persistence of the distribution across time of Catholics along the left-
right axis both in Italy and Brazil, the data of the different surveys are aggregated.  
Two models of linear regression are presented: the first one takes into account only the 
religious variables; the second, instead, introduces the most important socio-
demographic variables, as control variables of the first model. 
Specifically, the first model explains Catholics’ self-positioning on the left-right scale 
using as independent variables the attendance of religious services; the importance 
attributed to God and to religion in ones’ own life; and the confidence in the Church as a 
moral institution.  
The model is formalized as follows 3: 
 
Model 1: Y = B0+B1x1+ B2x2+ B3x3+ B4x4 
 
Where: 
 
Y=  Catholics’ self-positioning on the left-right scale 
B0=  constant 
B1x1=  attendance of religious services 4 
B2x2= confidence in Church 5 
B3x3= how important is God in your life 6 
B4x4=  how important is religion in your life 7 
 
Given the limited variance in religious values and attitudes expressed by Brazilian 
Catholics (see previous paragraph) — confirming a predominately external religious 
patchwork — the first hypothesis (H1) is that the proposed model has a greater ability to 
explain the positioning on the left-right axis in the Italian context, where a considerable 
internal patchwork has been observed. 
                                                      
3 Among the variables relating to attitudes and religious values in the different waves of the WVS, these, 
(in addition to tapping fundamnetal dimesnions), are technically the only ones present in several waves in 
both countries. 
4 The variable was recoded as a dichotomous: value 0 (those who practice less than once per month); 
value 1 (those who practice at least once a month).  
5 The variable was recoded as dichotomous: value 0 (those who have little or no confidence in the 
Church); value 1 (those who are fairly or very confident in the Church). 
6 The variable is a ten-point scale. 
7 The variable was recoded as dichotomous: value 0 (those who believe that religion has little or no 
importance) value 1 (those who believe that religion is fairly or very important). 
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In line with the literature cited above, moreover, the hypothesis (H2) is put forward that 
those who attend religious services more frequently place themselves in more rightist 
positions in Italy, while in Brazil the opposite happens, given the role that Liberation 
theology has played for a long time in the country. The same relationship — opposite in 
the two contexts — is hypothesized for the other variables included in the model as 
well. 
 
Table 1 Explaining self-positioining on the left-right scale. Religious variables 
  Italy   Brazil 
  B   
Standard 
Error Sig.   B   
Standard 
Error  Sig. 
How often 
attend 
religious 
services  0,256  0,093 0,006  -0,118  0,149 0,208 
Confidence in 
churches  0,304  0,106 0,004  0,244  0,168 0,145 
How important 
is God in your 
life 0,079  0,021 0,000  0,102  0,051 0,047 
How important 
is religion  -0,034  0,123 0,781  0,44  0,246 0,074 
          
Constant 4,366  0,152     4,286  0,526   
          
R square 0,023     0,006    
N 2795         2062       
Model 
significance    0,000     0,018 
Durbin-watson  1,81     1,925    
VIF no col.         no col.       
 
 
Model 1, both for Italian and Brazilian Catholics, is statistically significant and is not 
invalidated by problems of collinearity and (temporal) correlation among variables. The 
first hypothesis is verified: the model has a greater explanatory power of the placement 
on the left-right axis more among Italian than among Brazilian Catholics. 
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However, it has to be noticed that in both cases the value of R2 is very low, pointing to 
the fact that in both contexts religious variables explain little of the dependent variable. 
As to the specific hypotheses, for Italy’s case a significant relationship has been shown 
to exist between higher church attendance and, after controlling for the other variables, 
place themselves in more rightist positions on the ideological axis. On the contrary, this 
variable (service attendance) does not have any significant impact in Brazil, possibly 
because it is more important the type of practiced cult — especially if charismatic or 
inspired by Liberation theology — rather than attending religious services as such. 
In the Italian context having confidence in the Church and deeming God important for 
one’s own life are very significant elements as well to explain Catholics’ positioning 
themselves toward the right end of the spectrum. On the other hand, deeming religion 
important in one’s own life is not significant. 
Among Brazilian Catholics, on the contrary, the importance of religion plays a significant 
role. As it does, albeit to a limited extent, deeming God important in one’s own life. Both 
variables show a positive relationship with the dependent variable: that is, the more the 
importance of God and of religion in life, the more Catholics place themselves on the 
right. Confidence in the Church, an institution rather far away from Brazilian land, does 
not appear to have a significant effect (after controlling for other variables).  
 The next step is to test the capacity of religious variables to explain Catholic political-
ideological positioning in the two settings. Introducing those socio-demographic 
variables which have shown to be able to better explain individual propensity toward the 
two ideological polarities does this: occupation, education, gender, income, subjective 
social class, and geographical location 8. 
 
The model is formalized as follows 9: 
 
 
Model 2: Y = B0+variables in Model 1 + 
Where: 
 
Y = Catholics’ self-positioning on the left-right scale 
B0 = constant 
B5 X 5= non manual work (reference dummy: executive work) 
B6 X 6= manual work (reference dummy: executive work) 
B7 X 7= middle education (reference dummy: lower education) 
                                                      
8 In Italy the North is more developed economically than the center and south, while in Brazil, by contrast, 
the areas of south-east and south are the more developed parts of the country. 
9 The number of cases decreases both in Italy and in Brazil, compared to the first model, because:  in 
Italy the variable "education" has been registered only in the last two waves (on which the analysis is 
developed); in Brazil on the other hand the variable " subjective social class ", traditionally important for 
positioning on the left-right axis at least in Europe, has not been registered in the 1989-1993 wave. 
Therefore, also for the Brazilian case analyzes are carried out on the two most recent waves (1994-1999 
and 2005-2007). 
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B8 X 8= higher education (reference dummy: lower education) 
B9 X 9= male 
B9 X 9= age 
B10X 10= for Italy: Centre (reference dummy: North) 
B11X 11= for Italy: South (reference dummy: North) 
B12X 12= for Brazil: Southeast 
B13X 13= income scale 10 
B14X 14= subjective social class11  
 
Considering that – as seen before – the literature maintains that the relationship 
between social structural variables and self-positioning on the left-right scale is much 
more volatile and less significant in Latin America than in Western Europe, the general 
hypothesis is that introducing socio-demographic factors in the model improves the 
power to explain the dependent variable more in Italy than in Brazil.  
In both countries it is expected that a manual job, a low level of income and subjective 
social class push individuals towards more leftist positions on the scale. On the other 
hand, ceteris paribus, living in the economically most developed areas drives individuals 
towards rightist positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
10 As defined in the WVS, this is a ten-point scale.  
11 As defined in the WVS, this is a five-categories scale. 
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Table2 Explaining self-positioining on the left-right scale. Religious and socio- 
demographic variables 
 
 
 Italy  Brazil 
 B  Standard Error Sig.  B  
Standard 
Error Sig. 
How often 
attend 
religious 
services 
0,194  0,154 0,207  -0,422  0,22 0,056 
Confidence 
in 
churches 
-0,07  0,178 0,693  0,179  0,221 0,42 
How 
important 
is God 
0,076  0,034 0,025  0,073  0,066 0,268 
How 
important 
is religion 
-0,048  0,201 0,812  0,088  0,358 0,806 
Non 
manual 
work 
-0,332  0,164 0,043  -0,09  0,253 0,724 
Manual 
work 
-0,424  0,196 0,03  0,016  0,238 0,946 
Higher 
education 
-0,334  0,223 -0,069  -0,277  0,273 0,311 
Middle 
education 
0,212  0,177 0,23  -0,291  0,201 0,149 
Male 0,258  0,131 0,05  0,097  0,166 0,562 
Dummy 
Centre 
-0,282  0,159 0,076      
Dummy 
South 
-0,295  0,153 0,054      
South-
East/South 
     -0,598  0,196 0,002 
Income 
scale 
-0,006  0,019 0,736  -0,007  0,042 0,862 
Subjective 
social 
class  
0,045  0,02 0,026  0,089  0,087 0,306 
Age 0,004  0,005 0,346  0,022  0,006 0 
Constant 4,804  0,415   4,941  0,887 0 
R square 0,035     0,033    
Sig. model.    0,001     0,001 
Durbin-
watson 
1,879     1,941    
ViF No col.     No col.    
N 1038     1058    
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Data analysis shows that the explanatory power of Model 2 also remains very low, and 
it has a greater increase in Brazil, contrary to what assumed previously. It should 
however be noted that the increase is very limited in both cases 
With respect to the previous model it can be seen that for Italian Catholics the only 
religious variable which remains significant, once the socio-demographic controls are 
included, is the importance of God in life: the more a person considers God important, 
the more it fits into the rightist pole along the ideological axis. 
In Italy education is not a discriminant variable in placing oneself on the left rather than 
on the right, or closer to or away from these two poles, while almost all socio-economic 
variables are significant, contrary to what happens in Brazil. This shows that perhaps 
the Italian social structure might still retain some degree of influence in choosing 
between left and right. In particular, self-perceived social class is fully significant and, as 
in the literature, the higher the social class of the Catholics interviewed in Italy the more 
they tend to move to the right. Not secondary is the fact that those who have a manual 
or non-manual job, compared to those who hold an executive one, are less likely to 
place themselves on the right. 
Other conditions being equal, even the areas of residence of respondents show timid 
significance. In fact, living in the Centre or in the South, rather than in the North of the 
country, decreases the likelihood for Italian Catholics to move to the right of the 
ideological axis. 
In contrast, in Brazil living in more economically developed regions, controlling for other 
variables is very significant and lowers the probability to move toward the rightist pole. 
The socio-economic variables are not significant, reflecting a persistent and rooted 
mismatch between social structure and political ideology. On the other hand, it is rather 
interesting to observe that age is a very significant variable, so much that the higher it is 
the more Catholics place themselves on rightist positions. Young people therefore, 
other things being equal, are more progressive in political-ideological terms.  
On the whole, the religious variables are not significant in explaining the overall 
ideological position of Catholics in Brazil, except for attendance at worship. This 
variable was not significant in Model 1, after controlling for other variables, shows a 
modest significance. It seems that those who attend mass at least once a month are 
less likely to place themselves in conservative positions than those who do not attend. 
Perhaps this reflects some inspiration from Liberation theology, but the data do not 
allow to confirm it fully. 
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